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Introduction
The burial ritual is a symbolic practice par excel-
lence (Ωi∫ek 1989.249). The postulate relates to He-
gel’s ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’. Ωi∫ek’s argument is
that the social subject by means of a compelled
choice takes upon himself the processes of death
and disintegration, and symbolically repeats them,
pretending that they resulted from his own free de-
cision as he ‘confers the form of a free act on an ir-
rational, contingent natural process’. In other words,
there is no denying that we are mortal beings, but
we give this ‘irrational’ natural process a meaning
by burial rituals. By repeating such symbolic prac-
tices, we try to ‘transform’ something traumatic, over
which we have no control, by pretending that we
have a free choice. The basis for Ωi∫ek’s argument is
to be found in social readings of Lacanian theory,
and in a triad of psychoanalytical concepts – the sym-
bolic, the imaginary and the Real. Death and disin-
tegration are facts in the realm of the Real that we
have to internalise as a ready-made symbolic order.
It is left to us to create our own set of imaginings that
obscure the ugly, which is often too traumatic to be
reproduced without subtle alterations or sublima-
tions, and by our actions that sustain or alter a sym-
bolic order. The bone and skull, passive objects that
we can hold and manipulate, are transformed into a
‘little piece of the Real’ that gives a skeleton an ‘im-
mediate effectivity of the Spirit’ and makes the buri-
al ‘the medium of social domination and power’
(Ωi∫ek 1989.227–241). The burial ritual is thus a ma-
nifestation of ideology – that is, a collective imagi-
nary mask – and empty symbolic gestures that make
us accept a given, meaningless reality as our own so-
cial construct.
The ‘social persona’
In ‘new archaeology’, an intellectual movement ad-
vocating logical positivism as a guide to research
philosophy (Earle et al 1987.501), the premise that
differences in mortuary treatment vary directly with
the status of the person within the living community
was introduced in the 1970s. Lewis Binford (1971.
19–20) embodied the anthropological concept of
‘social persona’, suggesting that mortuary customs
and beliefs were determined in part by representa-
tions of the social identities of the individual, and
in part by the extent to which other members of the
social group recognised responsibilities to the decea-
sed. It is not only that as the number of social roles
an individual held during life increased, so too would
the number of symbolic representations of those
roles, and that they would be adequately mirrored
in the treatment of the body, in grave architecture
and in grave goods, but also that the variation in the
structure of mortuary data reflects the degree of so-
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cial structural complexity characterising the society
itself. He argued that (i) ‘hunters and gatherers
should exhibit more egalitarian systems of status
grading, while among settled agriculturalists we
might expect more incidences of ranked or strati-
fied non-egalitarian systems of status grading’, and
that (ii) ‘age and sex should serve more commonly
as bases for mortuary distinction among hunter and
gatherers; while among agriculturalists, social posi-
tion, as varying independently of age and sex as well
as sub-group affiliation, should more commonly serve
as the basis for differential mortuary treatment’.
Thus ‘among the agriculturalists, there are more so-
cieties that could be classified as tribes and chief-
doms, while among the hunters and gatherers, bands
and tribes of minimal complexity are more common’.
Emphasising the social context of mortuary practi-
ces, Binford put forward Hertz’s idea that within the
same society the emotion provoked by death ‘va-
ries wildly in intensity according to the social char-
acter of the deceased’. After examining sample data
from forty non-state societies Binford (1971.18) pre-
mised that ‘there should be a high degree of isomor-
phism between (i) the complexity of the status struc-
ture in a socio-cultural system and (ii) the comple-
xity of mortuary ceremonialism as regards differen-
tial treatment of persons occupying different status
positions’.
In his dissertation Social Dimensions of Mortuary
Practices Arthur Saxe introduced the spatial dimen-
sion of mortuary practices. He proposed in ‘hypothe-
sis 8’ that ‘to the degree that corporate group rights
to use and /or control crucial but restricted resources
are attained and/or legitimise by means of lineal de-
scent from the dead (i.e. lineal ties to ancestors),
such groups will maintain formal disposal areas for
the exclusive disposal of their dead, and conversely’
(cf. Carr 1995.122).
Both approaches were based on middle-range sta-
tistical generalisations of the variability in mortuary
practices acquired from ethnographic and archaeolo-
gical data. Both interpreted their results as indicat-
ing that as societies move from hunter-gatherer or
shifting agricultural strategies to settled agricultural
strategies, burial practices increase in complexity.
Meanwhile, the Marxist anthropologist Claude Meil-
lassoux proposed the idea that ‘subsistence indebt-
edness’ is the agency which in small scale agricultu-
ral, kinship based social groups perpetuates perma-
nent and stable links to the ancestors. This maintains
the social hierarchy of the group, and legitimises
claims to the land they have settled and cultivated.
He explains the idea thus: “At all times the workers
of one [agricultural] cycle are indebted for seed
and food to the workers of the previous one, and
this cyclical renewal of the relations of produc-
tion theoretically never ends. As time goes on, it
amounts to a change in generation. But at any
moment, one man, the oldest of the group, owes
his subsistence to none of the living members of
his community, but only to the dead ancestors,
while all the other members of the community are
indebted to him.” (Meillassoux 1972.99).
The status of ancestors, it has been suggested, is ac-
hieved. The dead are required to undergo a series of
rites of passage before they can be considered ance-
stors. They are elected among those dead whom la-
ter generations regard as important. The elections
vary according to patterns of kinship and property
holding. Societies with strong patrilineal descent
principles have different ancestors from those with
bilateral kinship patterns. Jack Goody (1976; 1990)
has thus suggested that ancestors and property are
linked among hoe cultivators in household subsi-
stence strategies, but kinship and marriage can be
associated with plough agriculture, as part of a stra-
tegy of inheritance which safeguards property trans-
mission. Hunter-gatherers have been hypothesised
as having ‘nothing to gain from a person’s death’.
As ethnography shows, among the Hadza, Mbuti, Ba-
ka and !Kung, ideas about ancestors are weak, and
funerals less formal. Among the !Kung, the spirits of
the dead (not particular ancestors) are even belie-
ved to be a serious danger. Woodburn (1982.207–
208) has thus suggested ‘that an immediate-return
system does not provide fertile ground for the ideo-
logical elaboration of death beliefs and practices in
general’, nor a link between death and fertility or
ancestors and community.
Lynne Goldstein (1981.61) reformulated Saxe’s ’hy-
pothesis 8’, suggesting that “to the degree that cor-
porate group rights to use and/or control crucial
but restricted resources are attained and/or legit-
imized by lineal descent from the dead (i.e. lineal
ties to ancestors), such groups will, by the popular
religion and its ritualization, regularly reaffirm
the lineal corporate group and its rights. The main-
tenance of a permanent, specialized, bounded area
for the exclusive disposal of their dead was sugges-
ted to be one means of ritualization”. If a perma-
nent and bounded area for the exclusive disposal of
the group’s dead exists, then it is likely that this re-
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presents a corporate group that has rights over the
use and control of crucial but restricted resources.
Corporate control ‘is most likely to be attained and
legitimized by means of lineal descent from the
dead, either in terms of an actual lineage or in the
form of a strong, established tradition of the critical
resource passing from parent to offspring’. The more
organised and formal the area for the disposal of
the dead, the more conclusive is this interpretation.
Goldstein (l.c.) admits that when “considering the
wide range of variability in cultures, there is a low
probability that certain groups, even when in simi-
lar economic and environmental conditions, will
symbolize and ritualize aspects of their organiza-
tion in precisely the same way”. She recognised,
nevertheless, that the hypothesis was both signifi-
cant and useful for archaeologists, as it “appears
that if a particular situation is discovered archaeo-
logically, then statements can be made about so-
cial structure as well as the nature of the resource
utilised by the society”, and that “if there is a for-
mal bounded disposal area, used exclusively for
the dead, then the culture is probably one which
has a corporate group structure in the form of a
lineal descent system”.
‘Hypothesis 8’ was revived in the 1990s, in the pe-
riod when archaeology became ‘a broader, more ca-
tholic discipline’ (see Earle and Preucel 1987.501).
In an atmosphere of strong criticism of ‘new archa-
eology’, when the consensus against socio-economic
determinism was so strong that the names Saxe and
Goldstein did not even appear in post-processualist
discussions of the origins of Neolithic burials and fu-
neral practices, Ian Morris (1991.154) reinterpreted
the hypothesis such that “the lineage members do
not behave as it is predicted they should, but both
ancestor cult and mortuary rituals are conducted
in terms of the lineal transmission of property
within the descent group: the former stressing the
role of the lineage as a whole, the latter the role of
household and class interests within it”. Burial con-
texts thus act as ‘arenas’ where ancestor cults and
mortuary rituals work to mediate the transmission
of rights to power and property. The ‘cemetery-de-
scent-power argument’ was only one of several that
bound relationships between people; one person’s
freedom of access is another's lack of freedom.
Detailed cross-cultural worldwide surveys statistics
of mortuary practices of societies characterised by
both ‘social complexity’ and ‘agricultural intensity’
have suggested that ”social organization and social
personae are often not expressed directly in mor-
tuary practices, but rather are filtered through the
framework of philosophical-religious beliefs, world
views, and their symbolic codes... Local grave loca-
tion and formal demarcation of the cemetery most
frequently indicated the horizontal social position
of the deceased, including his/her lineal descent
group”. At the same time, these areas are also deter-
mined by many other social factors and beliefs about
the nature of the soul, nature, cosmologies, and the
nature of the afterlife (Carr 1995.189, 191–192).
Binford’s premise that ‘heterogeneity in mortuary
practice would vary directly with the complexity of
the status hierarchy’ was indeed strongly criticised
within the ‘post-processual’ intellectual milieu. Ian
Hodder, Michael Parker Pearson, Michael Shanks
and Christopher Tilley among others stated that
mortuary rituals are frequently utilised by the liv-
ing to negotiate, display, mask, or transform actual
power or social relations. Parker Pearson (1982) de-
veloped these criticisms in his focus on the role of
ideology in expressing or concealing the real rela-
tions of power within society. Rather than mortuary
practices directly reflecting such relations, he argued
that the living could manipulate the dead for their
own interests. Hodder (1982.141, 146) has emphasi-
sed that a burial ritual was not a passive reflection
of other aspects of life, and the dead often become
what they were not in life. He found Saxe’s hypothe-
sis disregards the cultural context that is so central
to ideology and ideological functions. He rejected the
cross-cultural perspective on principle, saying that
“When individuals act socially, and represent their
action to others, they necessarily do so within a
framework of meaning, and this framework is re-
lative and historically constructed. Without consi-
deration of the cultural context, one cannot hope
to understand the effects of past social actions.”
(Hodder 1984.53). Introducing active individuals,
Hodder (2000.25) turned to the practice theory of
Bourdieu, Giddens and Foucault. Within this theory,
social agents are frequently conceived of as indivi-
duals with goals, intentions and subjectivities, and
as historical moments in the negotiation of social
structure, strategies and relations. Discussing burials,
houses, women and men in the European Neolithic,
Hodder argued against Renfrew’s (1976) and Chap-
man’s (1981; see also 2003) ‘processual’ interpreta-
tion of the social role of Neolithic megalithic monu-
ments in western Europe as territorial markers in
segmentary societies, and/or as markers of periods
of imbalance between society and critical resources.
He suggested instead that megalithic tombs are are-
nas where ‘female reproduction was appropriated
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by the lineage’, and ‘competition between maternal
and paternal claims to reproductive and productive
resources was resolved’. All aspects of burial and an-
cestral rituals can be linked to ‘the same concern
with legitimating control of reproductive and pro-
ductive resources through an ideology of communal
work and participation for the lineage resources’
(Hodder 1984.66).
Parallel to this, Julian Thomas (1988) studied the so-
cial significances of burial practices in megalith cham-
bered tombs in southern Britain. He recognised ‘the
transition from the newly dead person to the ance-
stral bones’ and associated secondary burials and
feasting through the manipulation of human remains
and ‘circulation of people, bones, livestock and ot-
her material items, in both a symbolic and a real
sense’. While the ancestors were hypothesised as ‘an
omnipresent factor in social relations’, social structu-
ring is less evident, relating to gender and, above all,
to age categories.
‘Rites of passage’, secondary burial and ‘liminal
personae’
The suggested transition from body to bones clearly
relates to ‘rites of passage’ and to the achieved ance-
stors status that was discussed earlier by the L’An-
née Sociologique group. Hertz’s and van Gennep’s
processual concept of ‘rites of passage’ relates to
transition rituals that move individuals from one so-
cial status to another, reflecting physical changes and
altering responsibilities. Funerary rites extend this
to the other world and to the ancestors’ ‘invisible so-
ciety’, affecting both the living and the dead and
involving potential danger for each as ritual chan-
ges in identity occur. Hertz’s concept of ‘secondary
burial’ associates the premise that physical manipu-
lation of corpse relates to beliefs about the soul and
the afterlife, and the active remembrance of the dead
ancestors. Mortuary rites were to be understood like
other rites of passage as marking a transition in the
status of individuals, in this case to the ‘society of
souls’. The English translations of Hertz’s essay Con-
tribution à une étude sur la representation collec-
tive de la mort [1907], and Van Gennep’s work Les
Rites de Passage [1909] were published in 19601.
They are now basic and key theoretical reference
points for sociological, anthropological and archaeo-
logical ‘processual’ and ‘post-processual’ work on
death. Both emphasised collective representations
rather than the individual self.
Robert Hertz’s (2004; for the comments see Davies
2000) main focus was on the triad of the body of the
deceased, their soul, and the mourners on the one
hand, and on the social construction of emotion with
the relationship between the biological individual
and the social collectivity on the other. The life of a
person, he suggested, is a ‘succession of heterogene-
ous and well-defined phases, to each of which corre-
sponds a more or less organised social class’. Each
promotion of the individual implies ‘the passage from
one group to another’, which implies collective atten-
tion and ‘a deep change in society’s mental attitude
toward him’. The death was interpreted as a ‘lasting
procedure and that it is a transition that changes the
status of a person from being a living member to be-
ing a departed member of society’. The corpse is not
only a biological entity, but also a social one, closely
associated with the moral obligations that attend the
treatment of the dead. For Hertz, the word ‘moral’ is
practically synonymous with ‘social’. There is a ‘natu-
ral connection’, he suggests, between ‘beliefs concer-
ning the disintegration of the body, the fate of the
soul, and the social positions of the mourners.’ The
soul “only gradually severs the ties binding it to this
world: it finds a stable existence again only when
the representation of the deceased has acquired a
final and pacified character in the consciousness
of the survivors. There is too deep an opposition be-
tween the persisting image of a familiar person
who is like ourselves, and the image of an ances-
tor, who is sometimes worshipped and always di-
stant, for this second image to replace the former
immediately. That is why the idea of an ‘interme-
diary state between death and resurrection’ impo-
ses itself, a state in which the soul is thought to free
itself from the impurity of death or from the sin at-
taching to it. Thus, if a certain period is necessary
to banish the deceased from the land of the living,
it is because society, disturbed by the shock, must
gradually regain its balance; and because the dou-
ble mental process of disintegration and of synthe-
sis that the integration of an individual into a new
world supposes, is accomplished in a molecular fa-
shion, as it were, which requires time.” (Hertz
2004.210). The reduction of the corpse to bones that
remain more or less unchangeable relates to the
transitional phase, when death has no further impact
on the body. It seems to be ‘the condition and the
sign of the final deliverance’, the final act of chang-
ing identity. The body is now ‘similar to those of its
ancestors’, and there is no longer ‘any obstacle to
the soul’s entering their community’.
1 Hertz R. 1960. Death and The Right Hand (trans. Rodney and Claudia Needham). Cohen and West, London and Van Gennep
A. 1960. The rites of passage. Chicago University Press. Chicago, IL.
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Hertz correlates the change in identity of the dead
with primary and secondary burials. The first relates
to the ‘wet stage’, when the body has decomposed
and the identity of the dead is removed from the sta-
tus it held in life. The second, ‘dry’ stage confers a
new identity pertaining to the realm of the ances-
tors. He describes a variety of means by which the
‘frst burial’ takes place, whether this involves earth
burial, storage in large pots until dissolution occurs,
excarnation, or even endo-cannibalism, in which re-
latives eat the flesh of the dead. In terms of time,
mummification and cremation are interpreted as the
two extreme forms of funerary rites – the one a very
slow and the other a markedly rapid means of cop-
ing with the immediate corpse. Secondary burial is
associated with the exhumation and transfer of bo-
nes to the final burial place and the final ritual cere-
mony. It is not “a mere change of place; it brings
about a profound change in the condition of the
deceased; it delivers him from the isolation in
which he was plunged since his death, and reuni-
tes his body with those of his ancestors.” (Hertz
2004.205). This act ‘liberates the deceased from the
isolation in which he was plunged since his death,
and reunites his body with those of his ancestors,
and frees the mourners from their mourning obliga-
tions, permitting them to return to normal social
life’. Secondary burials and their associated rites thus
focus on the new identity and status of the decea-
sed and on the changed relationship between the
dead and the living. Secondary burial and the recre-
ation of life were later intensively discussed by an-
thropologists (Bloch and Parry 1982; Metcalf and
Huntington 1991).
Using cultural data on the Dayak of Borneo, Hertz
suggests that the transitional period between the ini-
tial disposal and the final burial lasts from eight
months to six years. This provides time for the de-
composition of the body, the purification of the
bones, the soul’s journey, and the liberation of the
mourners. In this liminal period, the soul lives mar-
ginally in two worlds. It does not belong to the an-
cestor’s world, nor can it resume its existence on
earth. The mourners are in a precarious state; they
no longer can live as others do; they do not dress or
adorn themselves, or eat the same foods as their
neighbours, and they may not leave the village. Hertz
(2004.204) suggests that “the final ceremony has
thus three objects; to give burial to the remains of
the deceased, to ensure the soul peace and access
to the land of the dead, and finally to free the liv-
ing from the obligations of mourning”. In some In-
donesian societies, souls are worshipped and set-
tled near the domestic hearth in consecrated statu-
ette of the deceased which they animate. Among the
Ostyak in Siberia, female relatives make a doll in the
image of the deceased. They dress, wash, and feed it
every day for two years if the dead person was a wo-
man and, for two and a half years if a man. They
then place the doll in a tomb. Mourning lasts four
months for a woman and five months for a man. But
it seems that the transitional period correlates with
the period of doll keeping (van Gennep 1960.149).
Among the Giriama and Miji Kenda in a Bantu area
in Kenya, ancestors are regenerated and embodied
in carved wooden posts; some are sculpturally mo-
delled. They animate the power once possessed by
the ancestors. While the smaller and simplified posts
are placed inside family houses or in the spirit house,
some others are inserted at the foot of the grave.
These are never moved; even when the people move
to a new site, the posts must be left undisturbed
(Brown 1980; Parkin 1991.207–208).
Writing just before Van Gennep introduced the con-
cept of rites of passage, Hertz based his analysis of
Dayak mortuary ritual on ethnographic data in the
British Museum that relate to one area of the world.
In contrast, van Gennep’s approach was based on a
wider cross-cultural survey and on the diversity of
embodied practices which constitute rites of passage
in various cultural contexts. Because of this, Marcel
Mauss accused him ‘of the British anthropological
tendency to go galloping off through the whole of
history and ethnography, instead of bringing analy-
sis to bear on a few typical and accurately studied
facts’. The critique closely relates to the view of mem-
bers of L’Année Sociologique in the early twentieth
century contra Tylor’s and Frazer’s notions of uni-
versal laws based on evolutionary principles as ex-
plaining social practices, for example, as historical
‘survivals’. It was suggested instead that social prac-
tices should be understood in terms of their function
and meaning in the present. Levi-Strauss also took
this view, stating, “Explanations by survival are al-
ways incomplete, because customs do not vanish
or survive without reason. When they survive, the
reason is to be found less in the viscosity of the hi-
storic process than in the durability of a function
that analysis of the present should make it possi-
ble to discern.” (cf. Hockey 2002.210).
Hertz and Van Gennep interpret funerary rites in a
similar way. They identify the transitional phase,
which is central to the trajectories in which indivi-
duals move between social positions, and are con-
cerned with how individuals produce and manage
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social change on the one hand, and how to regene-
rate and stabilise the social order on the other.
For van Gennep, rites of passage are transition ritu-
als that move individuals from one social status to
another, from one social and personal identity to
another. They are performed in critical periods in
the life of the individual, e.g., at birth, social puber-
ty, marriage and death. He described the status pas-
sage rituals as a threefold process with phases of se-
paration, segregation, and integration. He proposed
(1960.21) “to call the rites of separation from a
previous world, preliminal rites, those executed
during the transitional stage liminal (or threshold)
rites, and the ceremonies of incorporation into the
new world post-liminal rites.” In other words, the
tripartite ritual structure comprising: passage out
of a previous phase or social status; a liminal or, an
ambiguous time and space between fixed positions;
and an entry into a new social position or period.
The spatial element is important, since change of
status often involves a change of locality.
The liminal phase is central in funerals, since the in-
dividual and their survivors undergo extended pro-
cesses of transformation prior to eventual incorpo-
ration into new social contexts such as the world of
the ancestors. Mourning is also a transition. “Mour-
ning, which I formerly saw simply as an aggregate
of taboos and negative practices marking an iso-
lation from society of those whom death, in its phy-
sical reality, had placed in a sacred, impure state,
now appears to me to be a more complex pheno-
menon. It is a transitional period for the survivors,
and they enter it through rites of separation and
emerge from it through rites of reintegration into
society (rites of the lifting of mourning). In some
cases, the transitional period of the living is a coun-
terpart of the transitional period of the deceased,
and the termination of the first sometimes coin-
cides with the termination of the second – that is,
with the incorporation of the deceased into the
world of the dead.” (van Gennep 1960.146–147).
Van Gennep suggested that during mourning, the
living mourners and the deceased constitute a spe-
cial group embedded between the world of the liv-
ing and the world of the ancestors. Social life is sus-
pended and the length of the period depends on the
closeness of their relationship and/or degrees of
kinship, but not on the period of physical composi-
tion, as Hertz suggests. However, both suggest that
funeral rites involve a parallel process in which the
individuals become ‘part of each other’ in a way that
each identity is made up of other people’s agency.
Following Van Gennep’s conceptualisation of limen,
Victor Turner (1969.95) introduced the concept of
‘liminal personae’. These are not embedded any-
where, “neither here nor there; they are betwixt
and between the positions assigned and arrayed
by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial. As
such, their ambiguous and interminate attributes
are expressed by a rich variety of symbols in the
many societies that ritualize social and cultural
transition. Thus liminality is frequently linked to
death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to dark-
ness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness, and to an
eclipse of the sun and moon”. Turner attached this
anti-identity to ‘liminal entities, such as neophytes in
initiation or puberty rites that may be represented
as possessing nothing’. They may be ‘disguised as
monsters, wear only a strip of clothing, to demon-
strate that as liminal beings they have no status, pro-
perty, insignia, secular clothing indicating rank or
role, position in a kinship system; nothing that distin-
guish them from their fellow neophytes or initiands’.
‘Relational personhood’
In the intellectual milieu outside archaeology, the
concept of the person discussed since Marcel Mauss
([1938] 1985.20) is that the idea of the individual is
unique to Western thought. “Up to the seventeenth
and even up to the end of the eighteenth century,
the mentality of our ancestors is obsessed with the
question of knowing whether the individual soul
is a substance, or supported by a substance: whe-
ther it is the nature of man, or whether it is only
one of the two natures of man; whether it is one
and indivisible, or divisible and separable; whether
it is free, the absolute source of all action, or whe-
ther it is determined, fettered by other destinies, by
predestination.“ According to Mauss the idea that
the ‘person’ equals the ‘self ’, and the ‘self’ equals
consciousness, and is its primordial category, are
Cartesian notions. And there were philosophers –
Hume, Kant and Fichte – who conceptualised the
person as a well-defined, stable entity with imper-
meable boundaries and a unified and essential core.
The concept of the bounded individual as the para-
digm of the person thus gives jural, moral and social
significance to the mortal human being, the empiri-
cally observable entity. It was suggested that this
view was irrelevant to past communities with diffe-
rent conceptions of death, the body and person-
hood, on the one hand. On the other, we need to
distinguish between the ‘individual’, ‘self’, and ‘per-
son’ as biologist’s, psychologist’s, and sociologist’s
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conceptualisations of human beings. The concepts
differentiate the individual as a human, the self as
the locus of experience, and the person as the agent
in society (Harris 1989). The concept of personhood
that recognises the important social and collective
component of one’s identity – although surviving in
such contexts as the recognition of social persona
expressed in mortuary rituals (see Gillespie 2001) –
was favoured over the individual as an actor and not
a reflection of the social order (Hodder 1986).
In his plea for an ‘anti-humanist’ approach in archa-
eology Julian Thomas (2002.34; 2004; for discussion
see Knapp and van Dommelen 2008) suggests that
the greatest importance is that “once we recognise
that no aspect of identity or embodiment is suffici-
ently knowable for their universality to be estab-
lished, the potential difference of the past can be
more fully appreciated”. When we cast aside the
‘image of the autonomous individual’ a series of ‘ot-
her possibilities for ways of being human’ appears.
He suggests that, on the basis of an examination of
Neolithic burial contexts in which human bones and
artefacts were deliberately broken and rearranged
in secondary deposits, a Neolithic embodied person
can be understood as partible and dividual, as tem-
porary combinations of substances ‘tied into encom-
passing flows and processes of circulation’ Human
bones, he suggests, “continued to have a ‘life’ of
sorts following their transformation in mortuary
ritual”, and the dead were still integral parts of so-
ciety (Thomas 2002.42; see also Thomas 1996). It is
worth noting that a similar proposal was introduced
by John Chapman (2000a; 2000b). The social rela-
tions between the living, the deceased and the an-
cestors are mediated ‘through many material forms,
one of the principal are bones’, he suggests. In this
interpretative paradigm, human bones and/or frag-
mented artefacts do not simply symbolise kinship,
but constitute it with the aid of two parallel proces-
ses, of ‘enchainment’ and ‘accumulation’. The prac-
tice of the manipulation and selective removal of
body parts, with or without recombination, is “a
statement about the continuity of social relations
across the frontier of death” (Chapman 2000a.
144). The removal of bones to selected domestic or
mortuary contexts redefines the social relations be-
tween the living and those dead who become an-
cestors by keeping the essence of the dead alive
through the materiality of their bones. This attitude
to the body relates to the constitution and transfor-
mation of identities and ways of living, to what have
come to be called different aspects of personhood
that are not identical to or compatible with modern
western notions of bounded individuality. Discussing
the Neolithic sense of personhood, Chapman and
Thomas actualise Strathern’s and Wagner’s concept
of personhood and notion on ‘dividuality’. Strathern
summarises personhood as “what is drawn out of
the person are the social relationships of which it
is composed: it is a microcosm of relations” (cf.
Kirk 2006.344). In the treatment of the dead, Chap-
man recognises a distinction between ‘dividual’ and
‘individual’ notions of personhood. While the ‘indi-
vidual’ person is represented undivided in the bur-
ial of the complete articulated body, the ‘dividual’
can be associated with the burial of body parts or
bone deposits (Chapman 2000a.145; see also Chap-
man and Gaydarska 2007.53–70 and Jones 2005).
The association of bodies with other substances, ani-
mals, and pottery and stone artefacts is to be related
to the fragmented and multi-faceted ‘dividual’. Ma-
rilyn Strathern (1988; 1998) describes how Melane-
sian people exist as ‘dividual’ and ‘partible’ persons,
and that persons are constituted through social ac-
tion. She argues that persons are composed of rela-
tions with others and the ongoing relationships in
which each person engages. The dividual perception
(feature) of the person stresses that each person is
a composite of the substances and actions of others;
each person encompasses multiple constituent things
and relations received from other people. It is not
only substances that are parts of each person, but
also objects or even animals that are incorporated
into the person by the agency of ceremonial gift ex-
change. In a funerary rite, all of these different ele-
ments of the person are brought together around the
deceased. The rite thus brings the person together.
The implication is that, while alive, the person is di-
stributed throughout the social and material world,
and only becomes a whole person temporarily dur-
ing this mortuary rite. All the things that the person
embodies are brought together and made explicit
for everyone to see. They are then divided again,
and these parts are redistributed through mortuary
exchanges (for details see Fowler 2004). Thus per-
sonhood is neither fixed nor stable; it is a composite
and partible ‘artefact’ that marks the handling of
relationships through the possession and manipu-
lation of things, especially those that conceptualise
wealth and exchange.
It would be interesting at this point to introduce
what Knapp and van Dommelen (2008.20) recogni-
sed as ‘taking the same ethnographic cases for argu-
ing and opposing points of view’. They point out a
different reading of Strathern’s understanding and
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interpretation of the dividual and of the partibility
of persons. They suggest that “Thomas (2002a.34)
maintains that the concept of ‘individuality’ is in-
comprehensible in the Melanesian situation where
‘dividual’ identities emerge from various pre-exi-
sting relationships, and persons are conceptuali-
zed only as amalgams or hybrids of different rela-
tions and substances.” For Thomas (2002.34), Stra-
thern is arguing that individual agency can only be
understood in relational terms, and that one person’s
actions can only be seen in terms of another’s: the
corollary is that “no aspect of identity or embodi-
ment is sufficiently knowable for universality to be
established”. For Meskell (1999.33), Strathern is de-
scribing “multiple selves that are aspects of indivi-
dual persons’: the corollary is that agents act with-
in relationships and are revealed as a result of
those actions.”
In an interview published recently in the Journal of
Social Archaeology, Marylin Strathern elucidates the
dilemma, suggesting “In fact, that is very much like
one colleague’s complaint that he has never met a
dividual. No, of course, of course dividual and par-
tibility are to do with how people discriminate and
classify different dimensions of the person. So, yes,
I can look at this colleague and if I were a Papua
New Guinean, I would probably be very interested
in his relationships with his maternal kin and his
paternal kin and be interested in how he embodied
these two relations... because the way you relate to
your paternal kin is very different from the way
you relate to your maternal kin. Here is the dividu-
al. When the difference becomes materialized, and
you then give gifts to your maternal kin that you
derived from your paternal kin, and you then trace
that chain of relationships, there is a sense in which
the maternal kin have extracted those gifts from
you, but it does not imply my good colleague cut-
ting off his arm... I comment on my understanding
of the partibility of persons, and the way the per-
son in Melanesia is in a sense owned, not in the
sense of property but in the sense of being owned
by another person. Let me give you an example. If
you are in a patrilineal context your maternal kin
are very important because they supply supple-
mentary nurture, so without your maternal kin
your paternal kin cannot flourish, and you can-
not flourish. You are forever in debt. So you repay
with wealth and whatever, giving pigs and food
and money, and so forth. The gifts stand for that
bit of you that your maternal kin own and own
completely. That is, you are them, so this goes back
to Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s perspectivism. The
maternal kin have a perspective on their nephew:
this is my man, this is my nephew, and that rela-
tionship is a complete one. So, how the nephew ap-
pears is as a whole entity, you know, the nephew
isn’t at that point divided, the nephew appears
complete and totalizing in the regard of his ma-
ternal kin. And, reciprocally, they to him. Which is
very different from the fact that he can then switch
perspective, and he can then think about his pa-
ternal kin, to which his maternal kin are simply
an adjunct – this is changing perspectives. So, the
kind of literalism of parts and wholes that we
English-speakers have, that language won’t do; in
other words even when one starts to talk about
parts and wholes, we are introducing a whole trail
of assumptions from our own cultural nexus.” (Bo-
ri≤ 2010.286–287).
Strathern argues that the irreducibility of the indivi-
dual is a peculiarly modernist notion. Not all cultu-
res regard the individual as a single entity “bounded
and integrated, and set contrastingly against other
such wholes and against a natural and social back-
grounds” (Strathern I988.13, 57, 131). The Melane-
sian ‘person’ is conceptualised as a ‘composite of re-
lationships, a microcosm homologous to society at
large’. Thus, in contrast with the ‘western individual’,
this ‘dividual’ person objectifies relationships and
makes them known.
Nurit Bird Dawid (1999) has introduced into the dis-
cussion the concept of relational personhood. The
notion is based on an agency of ‘relatedness’ that
creates personhood by producing and reproducing
sharing relationships with neighbouring others, hu-
mans and spirits. Bird Dawid relates this concept to
the Nayaka, forest dwelling hunter-gatherers of Tamil
Nadu in South India. By maintaining relationships
with other beings to reproduce their personhood,
they reproduce the ‘devaru’ – a dividual person – of
the other beings with whom they share. The ‘deva-
ru’ is drawn into interrelating and sharing, and so
into Nayaka kinship relations. Nayaka thus refer to
both the spirits that inhabit the landscape and the
spirits of their own predecessors by terms that trans-
late as ‘big father’ and ‘big mother, and to themsel-
ves in relation to these spirits as sons and daugh-
ters. Relational personhood makes the Nayaka de-
scendants of the spirits of the landscape. Grandpa-
rent are ancestors, because they were there before
you, and because they guide you through the world,
but you are not descended from them. A certain
stone and/or animal may reveal itself to be ‘devaru’
if it ‘comes towards’ or ‘jumps up onto the lap of Na-
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yakas’. The stone is brought back to its places ‘to live’
with them.
It is important to note that Strathern and Bird-Dawid
have focused on systems of relations and their role
in the constitution of both person and culture, and
have been dealing with abstract forms of relationa-
lity, or modes of relating which make persons com-
posed dually of ‘dividual’ and ‘individual’ elements.
We must be careful, Andy Jones suggests, totalising
neither the ‘dividual’ nor the individual (Jones 2005.
196). He focuses on social practices, on the ways in
which persons are produced and performed through
networks of relationships, differing in each historical
context and involving both people and materiality.
It seems that Whitley’s (2002) intervention in post-
processual archaeology in terms of saying that Neo-
lithic ancestors are ‘omnipresent and omnicompe-
tent’ correlates accidentally with the new interpreta-
tive trajectory in which the dead body can be seen
as another form of material culture manipulated by
the living, perhaps mourners. Both artefacts and bo-
dies were governed by the principles of the agency
of partibility and circulation. Thomas has suggested
(2002.42), similarly to Brück (see below), that arte-
facts and bodies “...formed elements in a more ge-
neral ‘economy of substances’, which involved ot-
her materials. Both artefacts and bodies could be
broken down into parts, and artefacts at last were
made by putting different substances together. The
strong inference is that human bodies were not
understood as bounded and separate entities, but
as temporary combinations of substances, tied in-
to encompassing flows and processes of circula-
tion. The fleshed body of a living person might not
have been perceived as the ‘normal’ state of affairs,
or even as the only configuration of the body which
had a social presence.”
Joana Brück (2001a) has conceptualised ‘relational
personhood’ archaeologically. She emphasises po-
wer as an agency which is located either ‘within the
wider set of social relationships’, or ‘in the natural
world or in gods, spirits, and ancestors’. This leads
her to hypothesise that not only a ‘number of diffe-
rent sources of power and the range of social identi-
ties’ existed in the Neolithic, but also that different
agencies of power ‘produce socially adept and active
persons who work within the flexible milieu that
constitutes society’. The practices carried out at Neo-
lithic monuments thus might have ‘produced forms
of authority and identity that were contingent or
temporary’ parallel to those within areas of profane
practice. She argues that the social technologies of
pottery, animal and crop husbandry and metalwor-
king were also technologies of the self, conjoining
the person and the world. (Brück 2001b; 2004;
2009). She has postulated that the exchange and cir-
culation of both artefacts and the remains of the
dead, “facilitated biological, social, and material
reproduction through sequences of fragmentation,
mixing, and amalgamation. As such, the circula-
tion of objects during the British Bronze Age did
not result in the production of élite individuals. In-
stead, it constituted the person as a relational en-
tity, an aggregate of substances that could be com-
bined, reordered, and dispersed through exchange
with others.” (Brück 2006a.93)
Despite critics who suggest that recent archaeologi-
cal studies of death and burial have perpetuated the
hegemony of the living over the dead in understan-
ding past mortuary practices, and that the tendency
to see the dead body as simply another form of ma-
terial culture manipulated by the agency of mourners
is “one of the most unhelpful cross-cultural genera-
lizations implicit within contemporary archaeolo-
gical theory” (Williams 2004.265), the interpreta-
tive postulates of ‘relational personhood’ remain sta-
ble (see also Ingold 2000.132, 151).
Treatment of the dead has been shown to be impor-
tant for the realignment of personhood after death.
It is believed that the manipulation of dead bodies
was associated with ancestral rites and monuments
on the one hand, and was used to reinforce the exi-
sting social order through the construction of collec-
tive memory on the other. It was recently demon-
strated how body parts or bones acted as metaphors
for the dividual nature of the person, and how they
were central to the affirmation of identities, and the
power of the living (Berggren and Nilsson Stutz
2010; Brück 2001; 2004; Chapman 2000b; Morris
2000; Fowler 2001; 2004; Fahlander 2008; Fahlan-
der and Estigaard 2008; Graham 2009; Guerrero
et al. 2009; Kuijt 2008; Nilsson Stutz 2003; Thomas
2000). It has been suggested that in the re-creation
of a new body for the deceased, objects with meta-
phorical connections to the maintenance of the per-
son were used; and artefacts, and human and ani-
mal bones acted as extensions of the body, and as
metaphors for the transformation of the deceased
and the realignment of the self of both the living and
the dead, and the reproduction of society through
cyclical processes of fragmentation, dispersal and re-
incorporation (Williams 2003; Brück 2004; 2006a;
2006b).
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Instead of a conclusion
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